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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution, 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated (1996), and Rules 
3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESERVED FOR APPEAL AND PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues have been preserved for appeal and are 
presented for review: 
Issue #1; Did the trial court err in determining that on 
December 5, 1980, there was $5,000 in costs and attorney fees due 
and owing on the Promissory Notes? This issue was preserved for 
appeal at the evidentiary hearings on attorney fees held on 
September 8, 2000 and November 13, 2000. (R. at 936-37.) 
Issue #2: Did the trial court err in determining that on 
April 29, 1994, there were $88,911.67 in costs and attorney fees 
secured by the Trust .Deed? This issue was preserved for appeal 
at the evidentiary hearings on attorney fees held on September 8, 
2000 and November 13, 2000. (R. at 936-37.) 
Issue #3: Did the trial court err in denying Defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment? This issue was preserved 
for appeal in Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
1 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 445-51, 452-68.) 
Issue #4: Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment? This issue was preserved for appeal 
in Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 445-51, 452-68.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: A determination of whether $5,000 in costs and 
attorney fees were owing on the Promissory Notes on December 5, 
1980, involves a question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correction while affording no deference to the trial court. See 
Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, %6, 983 P.2d 575 
("Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Thus, we accord the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the 
contract no deference and review them for correctness." 
(Citations omitted)); see also Equitable Life & Cas. & Ins. Co. 
v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("In Utah, 
attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or 
contract. If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded 
in accordance with the terms of that contract." (Citations 
omitted)). In addition, the trial court's findings of fact as to 
the amount of attorney fees owed by the Dewsnups will be set 
2 
aside if they are "clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Issue #2: A determination of whether $88,911.67 in costs 
and attorney fees were secured by the Trust Deed on April 29, 
1994, involves a question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correction while affording no deference to the trial court. See 
Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, f6, 983 P.2d 575 
("Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Thus, we accord the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the 
contract no deference and review them for correctness." 
(Citations omitted)); see also Equitable Life & Cas. & Ins. Co. 
v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (uIn Utah, 
attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or 
contract. If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded 
in accordance with the terms of that contract." (Citations 
omitted)). In addition, the trial court's findings of fact as to 
the amount of attorney fees secured by the Trust Deed will be set 
aside if they are "clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Issue #3: A determination of whether the trial court erred 
in denying Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
involves a question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correction and accords no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Utah Coal & 
Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, 
3 
1(9, 43 5 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 ("We review a trial court's summary 
judgment ruling for correctness and afford no deference to its 
legal conclusions." (Citations omitted)). Further, when 
reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a party's 
motion for summary judgment, xxx[this Court] accept [s] the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the [losing] 
party.'" SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & 
Assocs. , 2001 UT 54, 1(9, 28 P.3d 669 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991)). 
Issue #4: A determination of whether the trial court erred 
in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment involves a 
question of law, which this Court reviews for correction and 
accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Utah Coal & Lumber Rest., Inc. v. 
Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, %S, 435 Utah Adv. Rep. 
14 ("We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for 
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." 
(Citations omitted)). Further, when reviewing a trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a party's motion for summary judgment, 
"
x[this Court] accept [s] the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the [losing] party.'" SME Indus., Inc. v. 
Thompson, Ventulett, 'Stainback & Assocs., 2001 UT 54, %9, 28 P.3d 
669 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 
4 
1991)) . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case is before this Court for the fourth time. See 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) (Timm I); Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) (Timm II); Timm v. Dewsnup, 
1999 UT 105, 990 P.2d 942 (Timm III). 
In 1978, Defendants Aletha Dewsnup and her late husband, T. 
LaMar Dewsnup, (collectively, the Dewsnups), borrowed $119,000 
for a two-year period to purchase a motel. The Dewsnups executed 
three promissory notes (Promissory Notes) totaling $119,000. In 
addition, the Dewsnups executed a trust deed and amended trust 
deed (collectively, the Trust Deed) in favor of Plaintiffs 
against the Dewsnups' 160-acre farm and 56.71 acres of land in 
Oak City, Utah (collectively, the Trust Deed Property).1 On June 
1, 1980, the balance of the debt came due and was not timely 
paid. By December 5, 1980, all the principal and interest due on 
the Promissory Notes was paid in full. 
On June 7, 1980, Plaintiffs advanced $49,966.21 on the 
Dewsnups' behalf under an "Assignment of Contract." The 
Assignment of Contract obligated the Dewsnups to reimburse 
xThe Dewsnups also executed a document entitled "Assignment 
of Contract" assigning to Plaintiffs the Dewsnups' interest in a 
real estate purchase contract, and a document entitled "Security 
Agreement" securing the loan with certain water rights owned by 
the Dewsnups. 
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Plaintiffs for the advance. That debt, however, was not secured 
by the Trust Deed. 
After all principal and interest due on the Promissory Notes 
had been paid in full, Plaintiffs continued to pursue the 
Dewsnups for collection of the $49,966.21 advance. On April 29, 
1994, Plaintiffs foreclosed on the Trust Deed for the $49,966.21 
(together with interest thereon in the amount of $116,869,35), 
plus $50,5 30.76 in attorney fees (together with interest thereon 
in the amount of $5,488.30). 
In Timm (III), this Court held that the $49,966.21 debt was 
not secured by the Trust Deed and remanded for a determination of 
the costs and attorney fees due under the Promissory Notes at the 
time principal and interest on the Promissory Notes was paid in 
full (December 5, 1980) and at the time of the foreclosure sale 
(April 29, 1994). 1999 UT 105, Hl5, 990 P.2d 942. In so doing, 
this Court stated as follows: 
We . . . remand this case to the trial court 
to determine what amount, if any, of attorney 
fees remained unpaid on the promissory notes 
when the sale was held. It was only for that 
cimount that the foreclosure sale could have 
legally been held. For all amounts in excess 
of that amount, the sale was defective. 
Because any excess debt owing by Dewsnup was 
not secured by the trust deed property, it 
follows that the trial court erred in 
dismissing Dewsnup's counterclaim for 
wrongful foreclosure. 
6 
Id. 
On remand, the trial court found that Plaintiffs had 
incurred $5,000 in costs in attorney fees in collecting the 
Promissory Notes at the time the Promissory Notes were paid in 
full (December 5, 1980) and that $88,911.67 in costs and attorney 
fees were secured by -the Trust Deed at the time of the 
foreclosure sale (April 29, 1994). (R. at 779-84); see also 
Addendum A, attached hereto. After the trial court entered its 
findings, both the Dewsnups and Plaintiffs filed for summary 
judgment. (R. at 788-90; 832-48; 849-51). The Dewsnups' Motion 
for Summary Judgment alleged that the foreclosure sale was 
defective because it (1) was barred by the statute of 
limitations, (2) foreclosed on an unsecured debt, (3) violated 
the one-action rule, and (4) failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements for a foreclosure sale. (R. at 834-48). The trial 
court denied the Dewsnups' motion and granted Plaintiffs' motion. 
(R. at 925-27) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 1, 1978, the Dewsnup executed the Promissory 
Notes totaling $119,000 in favor of Plaintiffs. (R. at 465.) 
2. On June 1, 1978, the Dewsnups also executed the Trust 
Deed to secure repayment of the Promissory Notes. The Trust Deed 
granted Plaintiffs a security interest in the Trust Deed 
7 
Property. (R. at 464-65.) 
3. As additional security for repayment of the Promissory 
Notes, the Dewsnups also executed an Assignment of Contract (the 
"Assignment of Contract") and a Security Agreement (the "Security 
Agreement"). The Assignment of Contract assigned to Plaintiffs a 
security interest in a real estate purchase contract (the "Arrow 
Purchase Contract") through which the Dewsnups were purchasing 
additional farm land (the "Arrow Property") from Arrow Investment 
Company. The Security Agreement granted Plaintiffs a security 
interest in certain "Conk irrigation water rights." (R. at 464.) 
4. On June 1, 1980, the Promissory Notes came due and the 
Dewsnups failed to pay off the loan at that time. (R. at 464.) 
5. By June 1, 1980, the Dewsnups had also failed to pay 
the 1979 property taxes on the Arrow Property and had failed to 
make the January 2, 1980 annual installment payment on the Arrow 
Purchase Contract. (R. at 464.) 
6. The Assignment of Contract provided that Plaintiffs 
could make the Dewsnups' payments under the Arrow Purchase 
Contract and then require the Dewsnups to reimburse Plaintiffs 
for those payments, to wit: 
[The Dewsnups] agree that in the event they 
are in default [under the Arrow Purchase 
Contract] that [Plaintiffs] may make payments 
due under and pursuant to [the Arrow Purchase 
Contract] and will be reimbursed for the same 
8 
by [the Dewsnups]. 
(R. at 463-64.) 
7. On June 2, 1980, Plaintiffs paid on behalf of the 
Dewsnups the January 2, 1980 Arrow Purchase Contract payment in 
the amount of $47,880.50, and paid the delinquent 1979 property 
taxes owing on the Arrow Property in the amount of $2085.71 
(collectively, the "$49,966.21 advance"). (R. at 463.) 
8. On September 16, 1980, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint 
seeking judgment against the Dewsnups, foreclosure on the Arrow 
Contract (under the Assignment of Contract), and foreclosure on 
the Conk irrigation water rights (under the Security Agreement) 
to recover the principal and interest on the $119,000 loan, the 
$49,966.21 advance, and Plaintiffs' costs and attorney fees. (R. 
at 463.) 
9. On December 3 and 5, 1980, the Dewsnups paid Plaintiffs 
all principal and interest due on the $119,000 loan, but the 
Dewsnups neither reimbursed Plaintiffs for the $49,966.21 advance 
nor for any costs and attorney fees incurred in collection of the 
Promissory Notes or the $49,966.21 advance. (R. at 462-63, 598-
600.) 
10. On March 3, 1981, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment for the $4 9,966.21 advance, $6,985 in attorney fees, and 
$53.50 in costs. (R. at 462.) 
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11. On April 24, 1981, the trial court entered a Summary 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (the "Judgment") awarding 
Plaintiffs judgment against the Dewsnups for the $49,966.21 
advance, $6,985 in attorney fees, and $53.50 in costs. (R. at 
462.) 
13. On August 29, 1988, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of 
Default on the Trust Deed. (R. at 461.) 
14. Plaintiffs did not send a copy of the Notice of Default 
by certified or registered mail to the Dewsnups. (R. at 461.) 
15. On or about March 24, 1994, Plaintiffs scheduled a 
nonjudicial trustee's sale of the Trust Deed Property for April 
29, 1994. (R. at 461.) 
16. Plaintiffs did not send the Dewsnups a copy of the 
Notice of Sale by certified or registered mail. (R. at 461.) 
17. Paragraph 21 of the Trust Deed provides that u[t]he 
undersigned Trustor [the Dewsnups] requests a copy of any notice 
of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to 
[them]." (R. at 460-61.) 
18. On March 28, 1994, the Dewsnups served their First Set 
of Interrogatories arid Request for Document Production on 
Plaintiffs requesting "the entire amount [Plaintiffs] claim is 
due and owing under the terms of the trust deed on which 
[Plaintiffs] are now foreclosing." (R. at 460.) 
10 
19. In Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of. Documents, 
Plaintiffs claimed that $222,814.62 in debt "is due and owing 
under the terms of the trust deed": 
$166,835.56 - The Judgment for $49,966.21, 
plus $116,869.35 in interest. 
12,433.30 - The Judgment for $6,985 in 
costs and attorney fees, 
plus $5,448.30 in 
interest. 
43,545.76 - Attorney fees and costs from 
March 1987 to April 21, 1994. 
$222,814.62 
(R. at 459); see also Addendum B, attached hereto. 
20. On April 29, 1994, Plaintiffs foreclosed on the Trust 
Deed. (R. at 459. ) 
21. Of the $222,814.62 of debt Plaintiffs claimed was 
secured by the Trust Deed, Plaintiffs bid and purchased the Trust 
Deed Property at the trustee's sale for $115,000. (R. at 440; 
459.) 
22. In 1996, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
$49,966.21 advance was not secured by the Trust Deed: 
An examination of the "Assignment of 
Contract" reveals that the Dewsnups were 
obligated to repay the lenders the $49,966.21 
paid under the Arrow contract. However, this 
debt was not secured by the trust deed . . . 
Timm II, 921 P.2d 1381, 1387-88 (Utah 1996). 
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23. As to the award of $6,985 in attorney fees and $53.50 
in costs, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded three 
years later to determine "what amount, if any, of attorney fees 
remained unpaid on the promissory notes when the sale was held." 
Timm III, 1999 UT 105, ^15, 990 P.2d 942. 
24. The Promissory Notes provide for recovery of costs and 
attorney fees incurred in collection of principal and interest on 
the $119,000 loan: 
In case of default in the payment of any 
installment of principal or interest as 
herein stipulated, then it shall be optional 
with the legal holder of this note to declare 
the entire sum hereof due and payable; and 
proceedings may at once be instituted for the 
recovery of the same by law, with accrued 
interest and costs, including reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
(R. at 469.) 
25. The Assignment of Contracts does not contain an 
attorney fees clause. (R. at 222-23.) Nor does Utah law allow 
for attorney fees in the circumstances described herein. 
Accordingly, there is no contractual nor statutory basis for 
awarding Plaintiffs attorney fees for recovery of the $49,966.21 
advance or subsequent collection actions related thereto. See 
Equitable Life & Cas. & Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if 
authorized by statute or contract. If provided for by contract, 
12 
attorney fees are awarded in accordance with the terms of that 
contract." (Internal citations omitted)). 
26. On September 8, 2000 and November 13, 2000, the trial 
court held evidentiary hearings to determine the amount of costs 
and attorney fees incurred in collection of principal and 
interest on the Promissory Notes at the time the principal and 
interest was paid in full (December 5, 1980) and to determine the 
amount of costs and attorney fees secured by the Trust Deed as of 
the date of the foreclosure sale (April 29, 1994). (R. at 936; 
937.) 
27. Plaintiffs claimed they had incurred a total of $5,000 
in costs and attorney fees related to collection of both the 
Promissory Notes and the $49,966.21 advance as of December 5, 
1980. (R. at 937, page 8, line 18-21.) 
28. As to the $5,000 in costs and attorneys fees claimed as 
of December 5, 1980, Plaintiffs did not distinguish between costs 
and attorney fees incurred in collection of principal and 
interest on the Promissory Note and costs and attorney fees 
incurred in collection of the $49,966.21 advance. (R. at 937, 
pages 19-21.)2 
2Wendell Bennett (Plaintiffs' attorney as of December 5, 
1980) testified at the November 13, 2000 hearing on attorney fees 
that plaintiffs had not asked him to make such an allocation and 
that he had not made such an allocation. (R. at 937, page 21, 
lines 5-8.) Although Mr. Bennett initially testified that he 
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29. The trial court allocated the entire $5,000 to "costs 
and attorney fees expended by the Plaintiffs" "to collect the 
sums due under the Promissory Notes." (R. at 780.) 
30. From December 5, 1980 through April 29, 1994, 
Plaintiffs claimed that they had incurred $83,911.67 in costs and 
attorney fees in pursuing collection of the $49,966.21 advance 
and other claims that plaintiffs had against the Dewsnups after 
December 5, 1980. (R. at 781; 936, pages 60-83; 937, pages 25-
31; Exhibits 1, 2 and 6.) 
31. As to the $83,911.67 in costs and attorneys fees 
Plaintiffs claimed were incurred after December 5, 1980, 
Plaintiffs did not distinguish between costs and attorney fees 
incurred in collection of the $49,966.21 advance or otherwise 
incurred. (R. 936, page 70, lines 12-15.)3 
didn't think he could allocate the $5,000 in costs and attorneys 
fees incurred as of December 5, 1980 between those incurred in 
collection of the Promissory Notes and those incurred in 
collection of the $49,966.21 advance, he later conceded that he 
"might be able to" do so. (Cf. R. at 93 7, page 20, line 4; R. at 
937, page 21, lines 1-4.) 
3Michciel Hayes testified on behalf of plaintiffs, on both 
September B, 2 0 00 and November 13, 2 000, regarding attorney fees 
and costs incurred by plaintiffs after December 5, 1980. At the 
September 8, 2000 hearing, Mr. Hayes testified that plaintiffs 
had made no allocation of the claimed $83,911.67 in costs and 
attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980 among the "various 
causes of action" that plaintiffs were pursuing against the 
Dewsnups after that date. (R. 936, page 70, lines 12-15.) On the 
November 18, 2000 hearing date, Mr. Hayes testified that 
plaintiffs still had made "no allocation on any basis." (R. 937, 
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32. The trial court found that the entire $83,911.67 was 
secured by the Trust Deed and owed by the Dewsnups. (R. at 781.) 
33. The trial court found that the amount secured by the 
Trust Deed at the time of April 29, 1994 trustee's sale was 
$88,911.67, which equaled $5,000 incurred prior to December 5, 
1980 plus $83,911.67 incurred between December 5, 1980 and April 
29, 1994. (R. at 781.) 
34. On December 20, 2000, the Dewsnups filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on their claim of wrongful foreclosure, 
alleging that the April 29, 1994 nonjudicial trustee's sale was 
defective because it was (1) barred by the statute of 
limitations, (2) not secured by the Trust Deed, (3) barred by the 
one-action rule, and (4) procedurally defective because neither a 
notice of default nor a notice of sale had been mailed to the 
Dewsnups. (R. at 832-48.) 
35. On February 12, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 849-51.) 
36. On September 24, 2001, the Court entered an Order 
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the 
Dewsnups' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. at 925-27); 
see also Addendum C, attached hereto. 
37. On April 24, 1992, the Dewsnups paid $3,362.37 to 
page 27, lines 13-21.*) 
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Plaintiffs through the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah. (R. at 448-49.) Plaintiffs did not give the 
Dewsnups credit for this payment against any costs and attorney 
fees that may have been owing.4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to allocate the costs and 
attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs. Only costs and attorney 
fees incurred in collecting the principal and interest due under 
the Promissory Notes prior to the date the principal and interest 
was paid in full (December 5, 1980) and costs and attorney fees 
incurred in conducting the trustees sale were either recoverable 
or secured by the Trust Deed. 
The April 29, 1994 trustee's sale (1) violated the "one 
action" rule, as set forth under Section 78-37-1 of the Utah Code 
Ann., because Plaintiffs already had a judgment against the 
Dewsnups for the same debt foreclosed on at the trustee's sale, 
(2) was bairred by the applicable statute of limitations, as 
defined under Section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code Ann., because the 
trustee's sale was held more than six years after the default on 
the Promissory Notes, and (3) foreclosed on the Trust Deed for 
4
 Plaintiffs' claim for $88,911.67 in costs and attorney 
fees did not give the Dewsnups credit for this payment. See 
Paragraphs 27, 30, 32 and 3 3 above, and citations to the record 
set forth therein. 
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debt not secured by the Trust Deed, and (4) the trustee's sale 
was procedurally defective because Plaintiffs did not send the 
Dewsnup a copy of either the notice of default or the notice of 
sale as required by statute. 
The trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, thereby dismissing all of the Dewsnups' 
counterclaims, including wrongful foreclosure, breach of the 
implied covenant/duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional 
and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress, failure to 
reconvey trust deed, and punitive damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $5,000 IN COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES INCURRED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 5, 1980 SHOULD BE 
REVERSED. 
As a matter of law, Plaintiffs and the trial court should 
have but failed to properly allocate costs and attorney fees. 
An award of attorney fees must be based on 
the evidence and supported by findings of 
fact. . . .[Al party seeking fees must 
allocate its fee request according to its 
underlying claims. . . .The trial court . . 
. must make an independent evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the requested fees in light 
of the parties' evidentiary submissions. 
. . .The trial court should also document its 
evaluation of the requested fees' 
reasonableness through findings of fact. 
These findings should mirror the requesting 
party's allocation of fees per claims and 
parties and should support any award issued. 
[Proper findings, i.e., those that mirror the 
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requesting party's allocation of fees] enable 
the reviewing court to make an independent 
review of the fee award, and [to determine] 
whether the findings are sufficient to 
support the award. . . .The findings of 
fact, furthermore, should detail the factors 
considered dispositive by the trial court in 
calculating the award. 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added); accord Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App. 232, 1(37, 30 
P.3d 436 (quoting Foote, 962 P.2d at 55). Because both 
Plaintiffs and the trial court failed to properly allocate costs 
and attorney fees, the award of attorney fees cannot stand. See 
Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 (reviewing trial court's findings on award 
of fees for correctness). 
A. Plaintiffs Failed to Allocate Costs and Attorney Fees 
As previously stated, ua party seeking fees must allocate 
its fee request according to its underlying claims." Id. at 55. 
Indeed, the party must categorize the time 
and fees expended for "(1) successful claims 
for which there may be an entitlement to 
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for 
which there would have been an entitlement to 
attorney fees had the claims been successful, 
and (3) claims for which there is no 
entitlement to attorney fees." Claims must 
also be categorized according to the various 
opposing parties. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs failed to meet this 
burden when they claimed they had incurred a total of $5,000 in 
costs and attorney fees related to collection of both the 
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Promissory Notes and the $4 9,966.21 advance as of December 5, 
1980, but failed to allocate (or otherwise distinguish between) 
costs and attorney fees incurred in collection of principal and 
interest on the Promissory Note and costs and attorney fees 
incurred in collection of the $49,966.21 advance. Accordingly, 
the trial court's decision to allocate the entire $5,000 to 
"costs and attorney fees expended by the Plaintiffs" "to collect 
the sums due under the Promissory Notes" is error and cannot 
stand. (R. at 780); see also Addendum A, attached hereto. 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Properly Allocate Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
As previously mentioned, "[t]he trial court . . . must make 
an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested 
fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions." Foote, 
962 P.2d at 55 (citation omitted). In addition, 
[t]he trial court should . . . document its 
evaluation of the requested fees' 
reasonableness through findings of fact. 
These findings should mirror the requesting 
party's allocation of fees per claims and 
parties and should support any award issued. 
[Proper findings, i.e., those that mirror the 
requesting party's allocation of fees] enable 
the reviewing court to make an independent 
review of the fee award, and [to determine] 
whether the findings are sufficient to 
support the award. . . .The findings of 
fact, furthermore, should detail the factors 
considered "dispositive by the trial court in 
calculating the award. 
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Id. (citations omitted). The trial court's findings fail to 
acknowledge that Plaintiffs were attempting to collect under two 
separate debts -- $119,000 owed under the Promissory Notes and 
$4 9,966.21 owed under the Assignment of Contract.5 The record 
provides ample evidence that some (if not most) of the costs and 
attorney's fees incurred by plaintiffs prior to December 5, 1980 
were incurred in an attempt to recover the $49,966.21 advance. 
(See, e.g., Complaint, filed September 16, 1980, setting forth a 
claim for recovery of the $49,966.21 advance, R. 001.) 
Accordingly, the trial court's decision to allocate all $5,000 to 
collection of the Promissory Notes was error as a matter of law 
(by failing to apply the applicable legal standard which requires 
allocation) as well as a "clearly erroneous" finding of fact. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $83,911.67 IN COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED AFTER DECEMBER 5, 1980 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in concluding that 
the $83,911.67 in attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980, 
5The Assignment of Contract does not provide an attorney 
fees provision; therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover 
attorney fees incurred in collection of the $49,966.21 debt. See 
Foote, 962 P.2d at 54 ("Fees provided for by contract . . . are 
allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the 
contract." (Citations omitted)). In addition, the Assignment of 
Contract was not secured by the Trust Deed; thus, the trial 
court's conclusion that the $5,000 in costs and attorney fees was 
"secured by Plaintiffs['] Trust Deed" is clear error. (R. at 
783) . 
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were secured by the Trust Deed. (See R. at 781; 783) ; see also 
Addendum A, attached hereto. In Utah, attorney fees are 
awardable only if authorized by statute or contract. See Golden 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985) . "Fees 
provided for by contract . . . are allowed only in strict 
accordance with the terms of the contract." Foote, 962 P.2d at 
54 (citations omitted). Further, when reviewing a contract, this 
Court will resolve any ambiguity against the drafter, which in 
this case is Plaintiffs. See Culbertson v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, Hl5, Nos. 981279, 981659, 2001 Utah LEXIS 
196, at *fl5, **13 ("constru [mg] any ambiguities in the 
[contract] against the prevailing parties who drafted [the 
contract]"). 
A. The Promissory Notes do not Allow for Recovery of Costs 
and Attorney Fees after December 5, 1980. 
The Promissory Notes provide the following clause: 
In case of default in the payment of any 
installment of principal or interest as 
herein stipulated, then it shall be optional 
with the legal holder of the note to declare 
the entire principal sum hereof due and 
payable; and proceedings may at once be 
instituted for recovery of the same [i.e., 
recovery of principal and interest] by law, 
with accrued interest and costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(R. at 469) (emphasis added). Once the Promissory Notes were 
paid in full on December 5, 1980, there was no contractual basis 
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under the Promissory Notes to recover costs and attorney's fees 
incurred thereafter. The Promissory Notes only allow for a 
recovery of costs and attorneys fees where there has been "a 
default" in the payment of principal and interest and only for 
recovery of "the same" (i.e., only for the recovery of the unpaid 
principal and interest.) As of December 5, 1980, there was no 
principal and interest to recover under the Promissory Notes, 
since all principal and interest had been paid in full. 
Accordingly, after December 5, 1980 no costs and attorney's fees 
could have been incurred for recovery of "the same" (i.e., for 
recovery of unpaid principal and interest.) 
Furthermore, there was no "default" in the payment of 
principal and interest after December 5, 1980. A "default" is 
defined as "[t]he omission or failure to perform a legal or 
contractual duty; esp., the failure to pay a debt when due." 
Black's Law Dictionary 428 (7th ed. 1999). Because all the 
principal and interest due on the Promissory Notes were paid in 
full by December 5, 1980, the Dewsnups were no longer in 
"default" in the payment of principal and interest as of December 
5, 1980 and could not be held liable under the Promissory Notes 
for costs and attorney fees incurred by plaintiffs after December 
5, 1980. 
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Even though some costs and attorney fees were owing under 
the Promissory Notes which had been incurred prior to December 5, 
1980 in collecting unpaid principal and interest due under the 
Promissory Notes, the Promissory Notes do not allow for recovery 
of any attorney fees that may have been incurred in collection of 
those attorney fees. Once all principal and interest on the 
Promissory Notes was paid in full on December 5, 1980, there was 
no further contractual basis under the Promissory Notes for 
Plaintiffs to recover any costs and attorney fees thereafter 
incurred by plaintiffs for any reason. See Softsolutions, Inc. 
v. Briaham Young Univ.. 2000 UT 46, 1(41, 1 P.3d 1095 ("If a 
contract provides for attorney fees, the award 'is allowed only 
in accordance with the terms of the contract.'" (Citation 
omitted)). 
B. The Trust Deeds Provide only for Recovery of Costs 
Associated with Conducting the Nonjudicial Trustee's 
Sale 
If the August 29, 1994 nonjudicial trustee's sale was not 
void (for the reasons hereafter discussed), the Dewsnups 
acknowledge that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs and 
attorney fees incurred in conducting the August 29, 1994 
nonjudicial trustee's sale under Paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed: 
Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, 
Beneficiary shall have the option to declare 
all sums secured hereby immediately due and 
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payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the 
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property and Beneficiary 
shall be entitled to recover in such 
proceeding all costs and expenses incident 
thereto, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the 
court. 
(R. at 116); see also Addendum D, attached hereto. However, no 
other costs and attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980 
could have been either recoverable or secured by the Trust Deed. 
C. Costs and Attorney Fees are not Recoverable for 
Collecting the $49,966.21 Advance 
After the Promissory Notes were paid in full in December 
1980, no costs and attorney fees could have been incurred in 
collection of the Promissory Notes. See Section II (A). The 
$83,911.67 in costs and attorney fees incurred between March, 
1987 and April 29, 1994 therefore had to be incurred in 
collecting the $49,966.21 due under the Assignment of Contract, 
or the costs and attorney fees incurred in collecting the costs 
and attorney fees incurred in collecting the Promissory Notes and 
the $49,966.21 advance incurred prior to December 5, 1980.6 
Attorney fees incurred in collecting the $4 9,966.21 due under the 
Assignment of Contract are irrelevant because that debt was not 
6As pireviously indicated, both Plaintiffs and the trial 
court failed to make a proper allocation of costs and attorney 
fees incurred in connection with this case. See Section I (A) 
and (B) of this brief. 
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secured by the Trust Deed. See Timm II. 921 P.2d at 1388 
(stating that "the Dewsnups were obligated to repay [Plaintiffs] 
the $49,966.21 . . . . However, this debt was not secured by the 
trust deed") In addition, the Assignment of Contract had no 
attorney fees provision; thus, there is no contractual basis for 
recovery of the costs and attorney fees related to the $49,966.21 
advance. See Golden Key Realty, Incf 699 P.2d at 734. 
Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the Dewsnups were 
responsible for $83,911.67 in costs and attorney fees incurred 
after December 5, 1980 and that such amount was secured by the 
Trust Deed should be set aside. (R. at 781); see also Addendum 
A, attached hereto; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
D. Plaintiffs Failed to Allocate Costs and Attorney 
Fees. 
As previously discussed in connection with costs and 
attorney fees due prior to December 5, 1980 (Section 1(A)), "a 
party seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its 
underlying claims." See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. Plaintiffs' also 
failed to meet this burden in connection with the $83,911.67 in 
costs and attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980, by 
failing to allocate (or otherwise distinguish between) costs and 
attorney fees that were recoverable under Paragraph 16 of the 
Trust Deed and all other costs and attorneys fees that were not 
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recoverable. 
E. The Trial Court Failed to Properly Allocate Costs and 
Attorney Fees. 
As also previously discussed in connection with costs and 
attorney fees due prior to December 5, 1980 (Section 1(B)), 
xx[t]he trial court . . . must make an independent evaluation of 
the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of the parties' 
evidentiary submissions." Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 (citation 
omitted). The trial court also failed to meet this burden in 
connection with the $83,911.67 in costs and attorney fees 
incurred after December 5, 1980, by failing to allocate (or 
otherwise distinguish between) costs and attorney fees that were 
recoverable under Paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed and all other 
costs and attorneys fees that were not recoverable. 
F. Plaintiffs are Estopped from Claiming Additional Costs 
and Attorney Fees. 
As a matter of equity, Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming 
additional costs and attorney fees associated with the 
foreclosure sale. Equitable estoppel is applicable when the 
following three elements are present: 
(I) a statement, admission, act, or failure 
to act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken or not 
taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; 
and (iii) injury to the second party that 
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would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. 
Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs. , Inc., 1999 UT 100, [^34, 989 
P.2d 1077 (citation omitted). "The doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is based upon fundamental notions of justice and fair 
dealing." Smotherman v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259, 265 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Because all three 
elements are satisfied in the present case, the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel prevents Plaintiffs from claiming additional 
costs and attorney fees. 
i. Plaintiffs made inconsistent statements 
In 1994, at the time of the foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs 
claimed that the debt for which the Trust Deed was foreclosed 
included $6,985 in costs and attorney fees awarded under the 
judgment, plus interest, and $43,545.76 in costs and attorney 
fees incurred between March 1987 and April 21, 1994. (See R. at 
425); see also Addendum B, attached hereto, at 2. Six years 
later, however, at evidentiary hearings held in September and 
November 2000, Plaintiffs' figure jumped from $50,530.76 ($6,985 
plus $43,545.76) to $88,911.67. (See R. at 936:30.) Plaintiffs' 
inconsistent statements satisfy the first element under Nunley. 
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ii. The Dewsnups acted reasonably after Plaintiffs' initial 
statement 
Under Sections 57-1-31 and 57-1-40 of the Utah Code Ann., 
the Dewsnups are entitled to rely on a representation as to the 
payoff at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-31(1) (Supp. 2001) (allowing debtor to "cure the existing 
default" by "pay[ing] . . . the beneficiary . . . the entire 
amount then due under the terms of [the] trust deed"); see id. § 
57-1-40(1) (a) (2000) (allowing reconveyance of the trust deed if 
"obligation secured by the trust deed . . . has been fully 
paid"). Under these circumstances, the Dewsnups' actions are 
reasonable, and therefore the second element under Nunley is 
satisfied. 
iii. Allowing Plaintiffs to repudiate their initial 
statement will injure the Dewsnups 
If this Court allows Plaintiffs to repudiate their initial 
statement, the Dewsnups will be injured in the amount of 
$38,380.91, which equals the difference between $50,530.76 and 
$88,911.67. Accordingly, all three elements of equitable 
estoppel are met, and therefore Plaintiffs should not be allowed 
to claim additional costs and attorney fees. 
G. Failure to Give Credit for $3,362.37 Payment. 
On April 24, 1992, the Dewsnups paid $3,362.37 to 
plaintiffs. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not give the 
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Dewsnups credit for this payment against the costs and attorney 
fees claimed due. (See Paragraph 30, Statement of Facts.) It is 
the Dewsnups' position that this payment would have more that 
covered the portion of the $5,000 in costs and attorney fees 
allocable to collection of the Promissory Notes and the Trust 
Deed should have been released at that time. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEWSNUPS7 MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in denying the 
Dewsnups' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there are no disputes as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Dewsnups' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment should have been granted because there are no 
disputes as to any material facts and the Dewsnups were entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
A. The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because 
the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale Violated the "One-
Action" Rule 
Under Section 78-37-1 of the Utah Code Ann., Plaintiffs can 
bring only "one action" for the recovery of debt secured by a 
mortgage on real property. Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1996). 
More specifically, Section 78-1-37 provides that u[t]here can be 
but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of 
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any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate . . . ." 
Id. This Court has long recognized that the one-action rule 
requires that " [a] creditor must foreclose and have a deficiency 
determined by the court before proceeding against the debtor 
personally." City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 
235 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted). Further, "[t]he [one-action] 
rule obviously applies to a creditor whose loan is in default to 
bar it from suing the debtor personally on the note until it 
first forecloses against the real property." Id. at 236. When a 
secured creditor sues on an underlying debt without first 
foreclosing on the trust deed, the creditor makes an election of 
remedies, electing the single action of the judicial proceeding, 
and thereby waives its right to sell the security under a power 
of sale. As stated in Walker v. Community Bank, 518 P.2d 329 
(Cal. 1974), 
since . . . "[there] can be but one form of 
action for the recovery of any debt" secured 
by a mortgage or deed of trust on real 
property, where the creditor sues on the 
obligation . . . against the debtor without 
seeking therein foreclosure of such mortgage 
or trust deed, he [or she] makes an election 
of remedies, electing the single remedy of a 
personal action, and thereby waives his [or 
her] right to foreclose on the security or to 
sell the security under a power of sale. 
Id. at 331 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted); 
see also City Consumer Servs., Inc., 815 P.2d at 236 (noting that 
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California's one-action rule "is virtually identical to Utah's 
one-action rule"). 
Plaintiffs violated the "one-action" rule when they 
conducted the nonjudicial foreclosure sale after having had 
already sued the Dewsnups on the underlying debt. Plaintiffs 
filed a Complaint and obtained a judgment against the Dewsnups 
personally without first foreclosing on the Trust Deed. The 
resulting Summary Judgment and Foreclosure Decree granted 
Plaintiffs a judgment against the Dewsnups personally for the 
$49,966.21 advance, together with interest thereon, $6,985 for 
attorney fees and $33.50 in costs: 
[T]here is now due and owing to the 
plaintiffs from the [the Dewsnups], the 
principal sum of $47,880.50, which is 
accruing interest at the rate of $23.61 per 
day from and after June 2, 1980, and the 
principal sum of $2,085.71, which is accruing 
interest at the rate of $1.02 per day from 
and after June 7, 1980, which accrual of 
interest shall continue until paid, together 
with $53.50 for court costs, and $6,985.00 
for the costs of collection, including 
attorney's fees, and plaintiffs are granted 
judgment against the . . . Dewsnup[s] in said 
amount. 
(R. at 426.) As stated herein, however, once Plaintiffs made 
their "election of remedies" to collect the debt judicially, 
Plaintiffs waived their right, under the "one-action" rule, to 
non-judicially foreclose on the Trust Deed for the same debt. 
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Walker, 518 P.2d at 331. Nevertheless, the trial court allowed 
Plaintiffs to foreclose on the Trust Deed under a nonjudicial 
power of sale for the same debt for which Plaintiffs had obtained 
the earlier judgment against the Dewsnups, i.e., the $49,966.21 
advance, $6,985 in attorney fees, $53.50 in costs and post-
judgment interest.7 Accordingly, the nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale violated the "one-action" rule, and therefore the 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale is void as a matter of law. 
B. The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because 
the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale was Barred by the 
Statute of Limitations 
Under Section 57-1-34 of the Utah Code Ann., xx[t]he 
trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made . . . 
within the period prescribed by law for the commencement of an 
action on the obligation secured by the trust deed." Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-34 (2000) (emphasis added). In the present case, the 
"the obligation secured by the trust deed" is the Promissory 
Notes. Id. In Utah, the statutory period for bringing a claim 
under a promissory note is six years. See id. § 78-12-23(2) 
(1996) ("An action may be brought within six years . . . upon any 
7In addition to foreclosing on the Dewsnups' property for 
the $49,966.21 advance, $6,985 in attorney fees, $53.50 in costs 
and post-judgment interest, Plaintiffs also foreclosed on the 
Trust Deed for $43,545.76 in attorney fees and costs incurred by 
Plaintiffs from March, 1987 to April 21, 1994. The Judgment did 
not award Plaintiffs post judgment attorney fees. 
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contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing"). Because Plaintiffs brought their claim under the 
Promissory Notes after six years, the nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale was barred by the statute of limitations, and therefore the 
resulting judgment is void as a matter of law. 
Nevertheless, the trial court denied the Dewnups' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on this issue, relying on 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a)8 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41,9 and found that the 
Dewsnups' bankruptcy tolled the running of the statute of 
limitations. (See R. at 916-17.) In so doing, the trial court 
ignored the fact that Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Default on 
August 29, 1988, during the same time Plaintiffs now claim the 
statute of limitations was tolled because 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) 
stayed Plaintiffs from "the commencement . . . of a[n] . . . 
action or proceeding against the [Dewsnups] . . . ." 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 362(a)(1) (1993). 
8Title 11, Section 362(a), of the United States Code states 
that wa petition filed . . . operates as a stay, applicable to 
all entities, of . . . the commencement or continuation . . . of 
a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against 
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the 
commencement of the case under th[e] [Bankruptcy Code]." 11 
U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(1) (1993). 
9Section 78-12-41 of the Utah Code Ann. provides: "When the 
commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory 
prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or 
prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41 (1996). 
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Plaintiffs are estopped from applying 11 U.S.C. 362(a) when 
it is convenient for them. Cf. Strichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds v. Jordanelle Special Serv. Dist., 2001 UT App. 257, f25, 
429 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Thorne, J., dissenting) ("Th[e] doctrine 
[of judicial estoppel] prevents parties from "playing 'fast and 
loose' with the court or blowing 'hot and cold' during the course 
of litigation." Further, judicial estoppel 'seeks to prevent a 
litigant from asserting a position [that is] inconsistent, 
conflicts with, or is contrary to one that [he or] she has 
previously asserted in the same or in a previous proceeding.'" 
(Citations omitted) (third and fourth alterations in original)). 
If 11 U.S.C. 362(a) tolls the statute of limitations on the 
trustee's sale as Plaintiffs now claims, then the August 29, 1988 
Notice of Default is void because it was recorded in violation of 
the automatic stay. 
In short, Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. If the 
Notice of Default was not recorded in violation of the automatic 
stay, then the automatic stay did not toll the statute of 
limitations beyond August 29, 1988. The trustee's sale was held 
on April 29, 1994 (5 years and 8 months after the Notice of 
Default was recorded). The statute of limitations on the 
Promissory Notes began to run on June 1, 1980, and as of April 
16, 1981, the date the trial court entered its Summary Judgment, 
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the running of the statute of limitations was not tolled by the 
Dewsnups' bankruptcy. The period of time between August 29, 1988 
and April 29, 1994, together with the time between June 1, 1980 
and April 16, 1981, exceeds the six-year statute of limitations. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that the 
trustee's sale was not barred by the statute of limitations. 
In fact, the bankruptcy court's opinion in the Dewsnups' 
adversary action filed in 1987 is consistent with the Dewsnups' 
position that the Trust Deed property was abandoned and therefore 
was no longer subject to the automatic stay: 
There is no evidence before the Court as to whether 
this real property has been abandoned to the debtors or 
whether the trustee intends to do so. However, this 
adversary proceeding only states a cause of action if 
the property is abandoned. [The Dewsnups'] request can 
only make analytical sense in conjunction with an 
abandonment from the trustee, either pursuant to 
Section 554(a) or (b) upon the filing and granting of 
an appropriate motion for abandonment), or as a result 
of the operation of Section 554 ( c) (deeming property 
"not otherwise administered" to be abandoned at the 
time of the closing of the c a s e ) . . . . Therefore, for 
the purpose of this opinion, the Court will assume that 
the real property has been or will be abandoned to the 
debtors. 
Memorandum Opinion, issued June 15, 1988, Judge Glen E. Clark, 
Adversary Proceeding No. 87PC-0116; In re: LaMar Dewsnup and 
Aletha Dewsnup, Bankruptcy No. 84C-01746, footnote 1. (R. 21.) 
See R. at 21.) As set forth therein, the Bankruptcy Court found 
that "this adversary proceeding only states a cause of action if 
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the property is abandoned" (and therefore no longer subject to 
the automatic bankruptcy stay). On August 29, 1988, 2% months 
after that opinion had been issued, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of 
Default against the Property. Plaintiffs clearly understood from 
that opinion that the Bankruptcy Court deemed the Property 
"abandoned" and the automatic bankruptcy stay was no longer in 
effect. 
C. The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because 
the Foreclosed Debt was Not Secured by the Trust Deed 
In Utah, a creditor can only foreclose on a secured debt. 
See, e.g., Timm II, 921 P.2d at 1388 (stating that creditor 
cannot collect on an unsecured debt).; Timm III, 1999 UT 105, 1l3 
("[A] xtrust property may be sold . . . after a breach of an 
obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security.' 
It cannot be sold for other amounts." (Citation omitted)); see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (Supp. 2001) . According to 
Plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories, the Trust Deed secured 
$222,814.62 in debt, which is broken down as follows: 
$166,835.56 -- for the $49,966.21 advance 
plus $116,869.35 in post-
judgment interest thereon 
$ 43,545.30 --in costs and attorney fees 
incurred between March 198 7 
and April 21, 1994 
$ 12,433.30 -- for $6,985 in costs and 
attorney fees awarded under 
the judgment, plus $5,448.3 0 
in post-judgment interest 
$222,814.62 
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(See R. at 425.) On April 29, 1994, Plaintiffs held a trustee's 
sale on the Trust Deed property and purchased the property by 
bidding $115,000 of the $222,814.62 in debt Plaintiffs claimed 
was secured by the Trust Deed. (See R. at 44 0.) The Trustee's 
Deed, which conveyed-the Trust Deed property to Plaintiffs, 
states that the trustee sold the property to Plaintiffs for 
"$115,000.00 . . . in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness 
then secured by the Deed of Trust." (R. at 440) . 
However, the only debt that was secured by the Trust Deed 
was that portion of the $5,000 in costs and attorney fees 
incurred as of December 5, 1980 that was allocable to collection 
of the Promissory Notes and the costs and attorney fees incurred 
in connection with the trustee's sale. The Dewsnups had the 
right to obtain a reconveyance of the Trust Deed upon payment of 
that amount. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1) (Supp. 2001); see 
also 57-1-40 (1) (a) (2000). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs represented 
to the Dewsnups that $222,814.62 in debt was secured by the Trust 
Deed, (see R. at 425) , and then Plaintiffs purchased the Trust 
Deed property at the trustee's sale by bidding $115,000 of the 
$222,814.62 debt allegedly owed. (See R. at 440). 
The trial court concluded that because an earlier summary 
judgment entered in Plaintiffs' favor, (in which Plaintiffs 
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erroneously asserted that the $49,966.21 debt was secured by the 
Trust Deed), had not been overturned by this Court when the April 
29, 1994 trustee's sale was held, "Plaintiffs were acting under a 
valid summary judgment" at the time they conducted the trustee's 
sale. (R. at 917). In light of this Court's decision in Timm 
III, the trial court's ruling is clear error and should be 
reversed. 
Where the issue of whether a debt is secured by a trust deed 
is being litigated, the creditor holds a foreclosure sale on that 
debt at its own risk. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged this 
point in its previous rulings in this case: 
The lenders were on notice that [Mrs.] 
Dewsnup contested the amount, secured by the 
trust deed, that they claimed she owed. 
Before that issue was resolved, the lender 
proceeded with the foreclosure sale for the 
full amount claimed by them which amount we 
found to be excessive in Timm II. While 
[Mrs.] Dewsnup's failure to stay the sale may 
prevent her from recovering the property if 
it was sold to a bonafide purchaser, see Timm 
II, she may pursue her claim for damages. 
See Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719 (Utah 
1996) . 
We must therefore again remand this case to 
the trial court to determine what amount, if 
any, of attorneys fees remained unpaid on the 
promissory-notes when the sale was held. It 
was only for that amount that the foreclosure 
sale could have legally been held. For all 
amounts in excess of that amount, the sale 
was defective. 
Timm III, 1999 UT 105, Uf14-15 (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
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Plaintiffs may not "hide behind" a judgment that has since been 
reversed. 
The trial court also concluded that under Utah Code Ann., 
Section 57-1-29, the trustee was allowed to hold a foreclosure 
sale and to credit bid unsecured debt held by the beneficiary of 
the Trust Deed which was being foreclosed. Specifically, the 
trial court stated: 
Utah Code allows a trustee to apply the 
proceeds of a sale to those legally entitled 
to the proceeds. Defendants owed $88,911.67 
in attorneys fees. The plaintiffs bid in 
$115,000 of the debt. After applying this to 
the $88,911.67 the excess proceeds were 
applied to the $49,966.21 judgment lien on 
the Arrow Contract. 
(R. at 919). The trial court, however, failed to recognize that 
at the time of the foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs did not "apply" 
the difference between $88,911.67 and $115,000 to the unsecured 
debt. In fact, according to the Trustee's Deed, Plaintiffs 
purchased the Trust Deed property at the foreclosure sale for 
"$115,000.00 . . . in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness 
then secured by the Deed of Trust." (R. at 440.) As previously 
discussed, this Court has already determined that the $49,966,21 
debt was not secured by the Trust Deed. See Timm II, 921 P.2d at 
1388 (stating that "the $49,966.21 . . . debt was not secured by 
the trust deed"). 
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Furthermore, to allow a creditor to foreclose on property 
and to credit bid unsecured debt at the foreclosure sale as part 
of the purchase price is just like allowing the creditor to 
foreclose on the property for unsecured debt. Under Utah law, a 
trust deed cannot be foreclosed for a debt that is not secured by 
the trust deed. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (Supp. 2001); see 
also Timm III, 1999 UT 105, fl3, 990 P.2d 942 ("[A trust 
property] cannot be sold for other amounts."). This Court 
recognized this principle in First Security Bank of Utah v. 
Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 (Utah 1980), stating that "to attempt to 
foreclose . on the mortgager's home for debts incurred in 
operating a business and which debts are not specifically covered 
by the mortgage would be unconscionable and contrary to public 
policy." .Id. at 955-56 (internal quotations omitted). 
D. The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because 
Plaintiffs Failed to Mail the Dewsnups a Notice of 
Default or a Notice of Sale 
Under Section 57-1-26 of the Utah Code, Plaintiffs are 
required to mail both a notice of default and a notice of sale to 
any person requesting such notices. Specifically, Section 57-1-
26 states10: 
10The Dewsnups cite to the most recent version of Section 
57-1-26, which does not differ materially from the versions which 
were in place at the time of the default and trustee's sale. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26(2) (Supp. 2001), with id. § 57-
1-26(2) (Supp. 1981), and icL § 57-1-26(2) (1994). 
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Not later than ten days after recordation of 
a notice of default, the trustee or 
beneficiary shall mail, by certified or 
registered mail, with postage prepaid, a copy 
of the notice of default with the recording 
date shown, addressed to each person whose 
name and address are set forth in a request 
that has been recorded prior to the filing 
for record of the notice of default, directed 
to the address designated in the request. At 
least 2 0 days before the date of sale, the 
trustee shall mail, by certified or 
registered mail, return receipt requested 
with postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of 
the time and place of sale, addressed to each 
person whose name and address are set forth 
in a request that has been recorded prior to 
the filing for record of the notice of 
default, directed to the address designated 
in the request. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26(2) (Supp. 2001). The Dewsnups requested 
through the Trust Deed that both the notice of default and the 
notice of sale be mailed to them as trustor. See Addendum D at 
f21 (stating that "[t]he undersigned Trustor requests that a copy 
of any notice and default and . . . any notice of sale hereunder 
be mailed to him [or her]") Plaintiffs, however, failed to send 
the Dewsnups a copy of either the notice of default or the notice 
of sale, and thereby failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements of conducting a trustee's sale. As such, the 
foreclosure sale is defective and therefore should be set aside 
as a matter of law. 
The trial court, nevertheless, concluded that Plaintiffs' 
failure to provide the Dewsnups with statutory notice of default 
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and sale was "[im]material" to its decision to deny the Dewsnups' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. at 921.) Further, the 
trial court concluded that because the Dewsnups had "actual 
notice" of the foreclosure sale,11 Plaintiffs were relieved of 
their statutory duty to mail both the notice of default and the 
notice of sale to the Dewsnups under Section 57-1-26. (R. at 
921-22.) In so doing, the trial court relied on Concepts, Inc. 
v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam), which is inapposite because the debtors 
therein were served with a notice of sale, albeit technically 
flawed, and a notice of default was posted on the property to be 
sold, see id. at 1159; whereas the debtors in the present case 
(the Dewsnups) received neither a notice of default nor a notice 
of sale. Accordingly, the sale should be set aside to avoid the 
"unjust extremes" of the Dewsnups not being notified of the 
default and sale. Id. at 1159, 1160. 
In addition, the sale should be set aside because the trial 
court's ruling renders the debtors' statutory rights in 
foreclosure a dead letter. A notice of default is intended to 
give the debtor 90 days to cure the default before a sale is 
^Although the trial court's memorandum decision is not 
entirely clear, the trial court apparently believed that because 
the Dewsnups became aware of the foreclosure sale through the 
newspaper, Plaintiffs were relieved of their statutory duty under 
Section 57-1-26(2) . 
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scheduled. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1) (Supp. 2001) (stating 
that debtor may "cure the existing default" by tendering the 
amount due "within three months of the filing for record of 
notice of default"). In this case, because the notice of default 
was not sent to the Dewsnups, they did not have the opportunity 
to "cure the existing default." Id. Further, because the 
Dewsnups did not receive notice of default, they were not able to 
have their Motion to Stay decided before the foreclosure sale was 
held. As such, if the property has been sold to a bonafide 
purchaser, the Dewsnups have lost their right to recover the 
property. Similarly, the Dewsnups did not have 90 days to 
challenge Plaintiffs' allegation as to attorney fees and other 
debt alleged to be secured by the Trust Deed. By having to wait 
to read about the foreclosure sale in the newspaper, the Dewsnups 
were deprived of the time to adequately protect their interests. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the foreclosure sale 
was defective, and therefore it should be set aside. 
E. Measure of Damages. 
In her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Mrs. Dewsnups 
had requested damages for wrongful foreclosure in the amount of 
$115,000 (the amount plaintiffs' bid for the Property at the 
foreclosure sale), together with pre-judgment interest at the 
statutory rate set forth in Section 15-1-1(2) (10% per annum) 
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since the date of the foreclosure sale (April 29, 1994.) 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial courts' denial 
of Mrs. Dewsnups' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, with 
directions to enter judgment in Mrs. Dewsnup's favor in the 
amount set forth above. 
IV. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Because issues of material fact were in dispute, the trial 
court should not have granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Summary judgment should be granted only when "there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56® (emphasis added). "The presence of a dispute as to 
material facts disallows the granting of a summary judgment" in 
the present case, and therefore the trial court's decision to 
grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977). 
The primary issue of disputed fact in the present case 
involves Plaintiffs' failure to reconvey the Trust Deed Property 
in a timely manner after the Dewsnups made numerous attempts to 
resolve the issue of any remaining costs and attorney fees that 
may have been due under the Promissory Notes. In fact, from the 
time the principal and interest on the Promissory Notes secured 
by the Trust Deed were paid in full in December 1980 until the 
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trustee's sale occurred on April 29, 1994, Plaintiffs have 
continually and erroneously asserted that the $49,966.21 advance 
and the corresponding attorney fees must first be paid before 
Plaintiffs would reconvey the Trust Deed Property to the 
Dewsnups.12 As the following paragraphs explain, Plaintiffs' 
actions constitute unfair business practices, and the Dewsnups, 
at the very least, should be allowed to pursue their claim 
against Plaintiffs for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Wendall Bennett (Plaintiffs' 
lawyer at the time the principal and interest on the Promissory 
Notes were paid in full on December 5, 1980) freely admitted that 
even though Mr. Fillerup, the Dewsnups' attorney at the time, 
wanted that trust deed released after all principal and interest 
has been paid, he would not release the trust deed until all 
attorney fees had been paid and until the $49,966.21 unsecured 
debt was paid: 
A: I wasn't dividing them out, because as 
I recall, Mr. Fillerup wanted us to give 
him a release of the mortgages and I 
declined to do that, because my view on 
this thing was it was all tied into one 
bundle, and I wasn't going to allocate 
it out, and I would protect my client's 
12As explained in this brief, Plaintiffs' attempt to tie the 
$49,966.21 advance and the corresponding attorney fees to 
Plaintiffs' failure to reconvey the Trust Deed Property to the 
Dewsnups is flawed as a matter of law. 
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interest in getting this thing paid. It 
was secured by all of that property. 
Q: So it was your position that the 
[$49,966.21 debt! was secured by all of 
that property and you weren't going to 
release that [Trust Deed] until the 
[$49,966.21 debt] had been paid? 
A: That's correct. 
(R. at 937:17, 19) (emphasis added). 
Despite Plaintiffs' flawed attempt to tie an unsecured debt 
with no attorney fees provision to its decision not to reconvey 
the Trust Deed Property to the Dewsnups, the Dewsnups have been 
trying to obtain a release on the Trust Deed Property since 
December 5, 1980. The most notable attempts made by the Dewsnups 
are as follows: 
10. On or about November 28, 1984, the 
Department of Agriculture approved a loan to 
the Dewsnups in the amount of $40,000 to try 
to get the trust deed reconveyed. 
. . .[P]laintiffs rejected [the Dewsnups' 
offer]. 
11. On or about August 26, 1988, Associated 
Credit Union approved a loan for $10,000 [.] 
[T]his and other moneys were used to . . . 
try to get the trust deed reconveyed. 
. . .[P]laintiffs rejected [the Dewsnups' 
offer]. 
12. On April 24, 1992, $3,362.37 was paid by 
Aletha Dewsnup to plaintiffs through the 
United States District Court. Plaintiffs 
still refused to release the trust deed. 
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(R. at 448-49.) Plaintiffs have also refused to credit the 
Dewsnups' $3,362.37 payment against the amount owed at the April 
29, 1994 trustee's sale. Similarly, when the trustee's sale was 
scheduled for April 29, 1994, the Dewsnups' attorney requested a 
payoff of the amount required to recover the debt under the Trust 
Deed, together with the entire unsecured debt of $49,966.21 and 
all corresponding costs and attorney fees. 
In short, Plaintiffs have refused to accept money or 
otherwise negotiate release of the Trust Deed, but instead have 
held the Trust Deed Property hostage as leverage to force the 
Dewsnups to pay an unsecured debt, i.e., the $4 9,966.21 advance. 
A creditor who holds a trust deed property hostage as leverage to 
force payment of an unsecured debt does not act in "good faith by 
any reckoning." Hector, Inc. v. United Savs. & Loan Ass'nf 741 
P.2d 542, 545 (Utah 1987). Further, when one contracting party 
withholds performance under a contract in order to compel another 
contracting party to act under a different contract, he or she 
"can hardly insist that he [or she] acted in good faith." Swaner 
v. Union Mortgage Co., 99 Utah 298, 105 P.2d 342, 346 (1940). 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, which thereby prevented the Dewsnups from 
pursuing their claim against Plaintiffs for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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V. COSTS ON APPEAL 
Under Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
Dewsnups respectfully request costs incurred in this appeal. See 
Utah R. App. P. 34(a) (allowing appellant costs if judgment or 
order is reversed, or if judgment or order is affirmed, reversed 
in part, or vacated). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding the amount of costs and attorney 
fees owed by the Dewsnups should be reversed because both 
Plaintiffs and the trial court failed to properly allocate the 
costs and attorney fees claimed or otherwise adjudged owed. 
In addition, the trial court's award of $83,911.67 in 
attorney fees should be reversed because those fees are not 
secured by the Trust Deed and they are neither allowed under the 
Promissory Notes nor under the $49,966.21 advance. With respect 
to the $5,000 awarded in costs and attorney fees, this Court 
should once again remand this case for a determination of "what 
amount, if any, of attorney fees remained unpaid on the 
promissory notes when the sale was held." Timm III, 1999 UT 105, 
Hl5, 990 P.2d 942. 
Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Plaintiffs should 
be prevented from claiming additional costs and attorney fees 
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because: (i) Plaintiffs made inconsistent statements, (ii) the 
Dewsnups acted reasonably on the basis of Plaintiffs' initial 
statement, and (iii) the Dewsnups will be injured if Plaintiffs 
are allowed to repudiate their initial statement regarding the 
amount of costs and attorney fees owed in conjunction with the 
foreclosure sale. 
The trial court's order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying the Dewsnups' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment should be reversed. As a matter of law, the 
Dewsnups are entitled to summary judgment because the foreclosure 
sale violated the "one action" rule and was barred by the statute 
of limitations. The Dewsnups are also entitled to summary 
judgment because the foreclosed debt in the foreclosure was not 
secured by the Trust Deed and because Plaintiffs failed to mail 
the Dewsnups a notice of default and a notice of sale as Utah law 
requires. Judgment should be entered in Mrs. Dewsnup's favor and 
against plaintiffs for $115,000 (the amount plaintiffs bid for 
the property at the foreclosure sale) , together with interest at 
the statutory pre-judgment rate of 10% per annum from April 29, 
1994 (the foreclosure date) through the date judgment is entered. 
In addition, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment because a dispute of material fact exists 
regarding Plaintiffs' bad faith and unfair dealing throughout 
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this case and specifically with reference to the Dewsnups' 
attempt to have the Trust Deed Property reconveyed. As stated 
herein, the Dewsnups have a claim against Plaintiffs for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the 
trial court's decision to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment incorrectly'cut off the Dewsnups' opportunity to pursue 
Plaintiffs for bad faith and unfair dealing. For the reasons 
stated herein, trial court's decision to grant Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment should therefore be reversed. 
In closing, the Dewsnups request costs incurred in this 
appeal. 
DATED this 25th day of January, 2002. 
/ W I As^ 
^ s s e l l A. Cline 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Addendum A 
TiUED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
12. Michael Z. Hayes (#1432) Todd J. Godfrey (#6094) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
Telephone: (801)272-8998 
Fax: (801)272-1551 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^/'^..i^Oeputv 
—oooOooo-
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees of the 
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE AND 
ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT 
SHARING TRUST; ABCO 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and JOSEPH L. HENRIOD, 
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB 
TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA 
DEWSNUP ARROW INVESTMENT 
CO., a limited partnership, THE 
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF 
BERKELEY; IMPERIAL LAND TITLE, 
INC., as Trustee and EUGENE L. 
CARSON and ELAINE CARSON as 
Beneficiaries; STRINGHAM, 
MAZURAN, LARSEN & SABIN, a 
Professional Corporation; MINERAL 
FERTILIZER CO., INC., and HARRY 
V.KAPS, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
^ooVo 
Civil No. 7191 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Defendants. : 
—oooOooo— W 9 
This matter came before the Court for hearing initially on September 8, 2000, at 9:00 a.m., 
and was concluded on November 13, 2000, the Honorable Fred D. Howard presiding. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Michael Z. Hayes and Todd J. Godfrey. Defendant, Aletha Dewsnup, was 
represented by Russell A. Cline. The Court took evidence presented by Plaintiffs and also heard 
argument from the parties. The hearing was called for the purpose of determining the amount of 
costs and attorneys fees owing at the time the sale of the property at issue in this matter was 
conducted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court, having considered all the evidence submitted and the arguments of the parties, 
and being duly advised in the premises, hereby finds as follows: 
1. Defendants T. Lamar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup originally executed 3 
Promissory Note in favor of the Plaintiffs. These Notes, state, in part: 
In case of default in the payment of any installment of principal or 
interest as herein stipulated, then it shall be optional for the legal 
holder of this Note to declare the entire principal sum hereof due and 
payable; and proceedings may at once be instituted for the recovery 
of the same by law, with accrued interests and costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
2. From the inception of this matter to December 5,1980, Plaintiffs were required to 
expend Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and attorneys fees in an attempt to collect amounts 
due under the Promissory Notes executed by Defendants. 
3. The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and attorneys fees expended by the 
Plaintiffs were expended in an effort to collect the sums due under the Promissory Notes. The Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000) was paid for costs actually incurred and for legal work actually 
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performed and the expenditures and the legal work performed were reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter. 
4. From December 5,1980, to April 29,1994, Plaintiffs were required to expend Eighty-
three Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($83,911.67) in costs and attorneys fees 
in an attempt to collect amounts due under the Promissory Notes executed by Defendants, and to 
protect Plaintiffs security for the payment of said notes. 
5. The Eighty-three Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($83,911.67) 
was paid for costs actually incurred and for legal work actually performed and the expenditures and 
the legal work performed were reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter and to 
preserve Plaintiffs' interest in the property which secured payment of all sums due under the 
Promissory Notes. 
6. Of the Eighty-eight Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($88,911.67) 
paid by Plaintiffs between the inception of this case and April 29, 1994, Eleven Thousand Eight 
Hundred Ninety-six Dollars and 07/100 ($11,896.07) were taxes on the property which served as 
security for payment of the Promissory Notes. The taxes were paid to avoid a tax sale of the property 
and in order to preserve the Plaintiffs' security interest. 
7. The Court finds that between December 5, 1980, and the award of Summary 
Judgment by the District Court on April 14,1981, work was performed to collect sums due under 
the Promissory Notes and to collect sums due for an advance paid by Plaintiffs under an Assignment 
of Contract, which Assignment of Contract also served as security for the payment of sums due 
under the Promissory Notes. 
31\Timm\4\F0F-C0L Attorney's Fees 3 
8. The Court finds that the attorneys fees expended for legal work during the time 
between December 5, 1980 and April 14, 1981 are not segregable and not allocable to separate 
causes of action, as pursuit of both causes of action was necessary to collect amounts due under the 
Promissory Notes and to preserve Plaintiffs security interest in the property. 
9. The Court finds that all fees and costs were reasonable under the circumstances of 
this case. The Court further finds that Defendant's repeated bankruptcy filings and efforts to prevent 
non-judicial sales of the property securing payment of sums due under the Promissory Notes created 
significant cost and legal expense for the Plaintiffs. 
10. The Court finds that all costs and fees incurred in bankruptcy proceedings between 
1981 and 1994 were necessary to preserve Plaintiffs security interest in the property and were 
incurred in an effort to recover amounts due for costs and attorneys fees under the Promissory Notes 
and Trust Deed. 
11. Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 506) authorizes Plaintiffs to recover 
costs and attorneys fees expended in protecting their security interest in the property of Defendant 
Aletha Dewsnup. 
12. The Trust Deed which gave Plaintiffs a security interest in Aletha Dewsnup's 
property authorizes recover of costs and attorneys fees expended by Plaintiffs in conducting the non-
judicial sale of the property. 
31\Timm\4\F0F-C0L Attorney's Fees 4 782 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, and in consideration of the relevant law, 
the Court concludes as follows: 
1. On December 5, 1980, there were Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and 
attorneys fees due and owing on the Promissory Notes which amounts were secured by Plaintiffs 
Trust Deed on the property.. 
2. On April 29,1994, there were Eighty-eight Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars 
and 67/100 ($88,911.67) in costs and attorneys fees due and owing on the Promissory Notes which 
amounts were secured by Plaintiffs Trust Deed on the property. 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorneys for Defendant 
783 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of November, 2000,1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS by mailing, postage prepaid, first class United States mail, 
to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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Addendum B 
MICHAEL Z. HAYES - 1432 
MAZURAN & HAYES P.C. 
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone (801) 484-6600 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UT^H 
oooOooo 
FILED 
COUNTY CLERK & EX OFFICIO CLERK 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 7191 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees 
of United Precision Machine 
and Engineering Company Profit 
Sharing Trust; ABCO Insurance 
Agency, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation; and JOSEPH L. 
HENRIOD, Trustee for the 
ANNETTE JACOB TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA 
DEWSNUP, ARROW INVESTMENT CO., 
a Limited Partnership, et al. 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
Pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Plaintiffs submit the following responses to Defendants' 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: With respect to the trustee sale 
scheduled for April 29, 1994, on the Dewsnup Trust Deed, please 
itemize the entire amount you claim is due and owing under the 
terms of the Trust Deed. Please show how you arrived at each 
_CLERK 
.DEPUTY! 
calculation. 
ANSWER: The amount due under the Trust Deed as of April 29, 
1994, is $222,814.62. The above figure is arrived at by taking the 
partial summary judgment of $47,880.50 together with interest at 
$23,61 per day for thirteen (13) years, which totals $112,029.45; 
the taxes awarded in the judgment of $2,085.71 plus $1.02 per day 
interest, totaling $4,839.90 in interest; the attorney's fees 
awarded in the judgment of $6,985.00 plus six percent (6%) interest 
for thirteen (13) years, which totals $5,448.30. The above figures 
give you a total partial summary judgment and interest to April 29, 
1994f of $179,268.86. To this figure is added attorney's fees and 
costs incurred from the date of the judgment in 1981 to April, 
1994, which totals $34,811.00 in attorney's fees and $8,734.76 in 
costs. All of the above figures total $222,814.62. This figure 
does not include attorney's fees and costs incurred after April 1, 
1994
 r nor does it include attorney's fees expended by the 
Plaintiffs between April 29, 1981 and March of 1987, which is the 
date that the Plaintiffs hired Michael Z. Hayes to represent them 
in this case. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Produce all documents and support the figures 
set forth in your answer to Interrogatory No. 1. 
RESPONSE: Attached to these requests are the copies of the 
calculations used to determine the figures set forth in Plaintiffs' 
answer to Interrogatory No. 1. 
2 
DATED this ^ ? A day of April, 1994. 
MICHAEL Z. HAVES ' 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* s s 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of April, 1994. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
3 
Addendum C 
COUNTY&m4OOfFlooy riC 
• v - ^ ^ L i ^ STRICT row 
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L ~ _ _ 
HttlARO C&UNTY * 
Michael Z. Hayes (#1432) 
Todd J. Godfrey (#6094) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
Telephone: (801)272-8998 
Fax: (801)272-1551 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, : 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees of the : 
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE AND ORDER 
ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT : 
SHARING TRUST; ABCO : 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah : 
corporation; and JOSEPH L. HENRIOD, : 
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB : 
TRUST, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA : Civil No. 7191 
DEWSNUP ARROW INVESTMENT &OO 14 Q 7 \C{ | 
CO., a limited partnership, THE : 
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF : Judge Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
BERKELEY; IMPERIAL LAND TITLE, 
INC., as Trustee and EUGENE L. : 
CARSON and ELAINE CARSON as 
Beneficiaries; STRINGHAM, : 
MAZURAN, LARSEN & SABIN, a : 
Professional Corporation; MINERAL : 
FERTILIZER CO., INC., and HARRY : 
V. KAPS, : 
Defendants. : 
—oooOooo— 
<-)&*•& 
This matter came before the Court on the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The Court, having considered the respective Briefs of the parties, on August 29, 2001, issued a 
Memorandum Decision on the parties' cross Motions, denying Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissing 
Defendant's Couaterclaim, in its entirety, with prejudice. In consideration of the above-referenced 
Memorandum Decision of the Court, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Memorandum Decision on the parties' 
cross Motions for Summary Judgment is hereby adopted as the Order of the Court and Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed, in its 
entirety, with prejudice. 
DATED this i  £4 
f 
day of September, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
cr v 
V-
/ 
Don^ld^jtri^e^r. 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO Fdftftft^ J? 
/ 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorney for Defendant Aletha Dewsnup 
31\Timm\4\0rder(MSJ) 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the far^ day of September, 2001,1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by mailing, postage prepaid, first class United States mail, 
to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
31\Timm\4\Order(MSJ) 3 
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Addendum D 
EARL JAY PECK 
NIELSEN,... HEMIQP./...GOTTFREDSON. & PECK 
AMf? 410 Newhouse B u i l d i n g 
3*i£> .S.slt...LaK.$...C.ity4....U.tah...8Alll 
5 2 1 - 3 3 5 0 
Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use 
A M E N D E D 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this 1 s t day of J u n e
 t 19..78 
between ....?..•....Lal^R..DEWSNUP and...^ETj^__pEWSNyP 
, as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is P.?.?.?.?.??. .y?^H 
(Stz-eet and number) (City) (State) 
EA?L.. JAY PECK
 ? a s TRUSTEE,* and 
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE & ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT SHARING TRUST, 
ABeO--l-N-SURAWGE--AGE-Ne-¥-r--ING^ ^ 
t h e A n n e t t e J a c o b T r u s t 
, as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in . . . M i l l a r d 
County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL ONE: See Exhibit 'A1 hereto 
PARCEL TWO: See Exhibit 'B' hereto 
25QQB 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by 3:pro-
missory notesof even date herewith, in the principal sum of $..3.3./..000.;....$.56.,..000
 ? made 'by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
"NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
TO PROTECT I HP SLCURITi Or THIS TRLsTDELO TRUSTOR AGREES 
1 To keep said propertv in good condition and repair ne t t > remove or demolish anv building thereon to 
complete r restore j r mptlv and in ^ood and workmanlike m inner inv buildm„ which mav h c nstracted 
damaged or destrcved thereon to complv with all 1 iws c \ n inK ind restricti ns ailccting •> nd pre pertv n t 
to commit or permit waste therecf not to commit sutfer or permit inv act upe n said propertv in vi l i t nn t lnv to 
d) all other aets which from the charietcr or use of said propertv miv be reasonablv necessirv the specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general and if the loan steured herebv or anv part thereof is I cmg oh 
tamed for the purpose of financing construction of impro\ements on said propertv Trustor further agrees 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable dihgenc0 to cc mpktion 
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary and 
(b) To allow Beneficiarv to inspect said property at all times during construction 
Trustee upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary setting forth facts sho\ in„ a default 
b> 1 rustor under this numbered paragraph is authorized to aceept as true and conclusive all taet and state 
ments therein and to act thereon hereuider 
2 To proviJe and maintain insurance of such type or tvpes and amounts as Beneficiarv mav require on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said pr pertv Such insurance sh ill he carried 
in companies approved bv Beneficiarv with loss pavable clauses in favor of and in form icre | tal lc to Beneficiary 
In event of loss Trustor shall give mmcdiate notice to Beneficiarv who mav make proof of loss and each insurance 
compary concerned is herebv authorised md hrected to male pavment t >r such less dir<ctl> i> I neliciarv 
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiarv j intiv and the insurance proc eds or any part there >f mav ne applied 
h\ Beneficiarv at its option to reduction of the indeb edness herebv secured cr to the rcsto a ion or repair of 
the property damaged 
3 To deliver to pav for and maintain with Beneficiarv until the indebtedness secured herebv is paid jn full 
such evidence of title as Beneficiarv mav require including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto 
4 To appear in and defend anv action or proceeding purporting to affect the secuntv hereof the title to 
said propertv or the r ghts or powers of Beneficiarv or Trustee and should Beneficiarv or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend anv such action or proceeding to pav all costs and expenses including cost of evi 
dence of title and attorney s fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee 
5 To pay at least 10 da \s before dehnquencv all taxes and assessments affecting said pre pertv including 
all assessments upon water companv stock and all rents assessments and charges for water a] purtenant to or 
used in connection with said propertv to pav when due all encumbrances charges a n i hens with interest 
on said property or anv part thereof which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto to pay all costs 
fees and expenses of this Trust 
6 Should Trustor fail to make anv payment or to do anv act as herein provided then Beneficiary or 
Trustee but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from anv obligation hereof mav Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the secuntv hereof Beneficiary or Trustee bemg authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes commence appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee pav purchase contest or compromise any 
encumbrance charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto and in ex 
ercismg any such powers incur any liability expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor including cost of evidence of Utle employ counsel and pay his reasonable fees 
7 To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder bv Beneficiarv or Trustee 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10r<:) per annum until paid and the repay 
ment thereof shall be secured hereby 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT 
8 Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of anv public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding or damaged bv fire or earthquake or m anv other manner Beneficiarv shall be 
entitled to all compensation awards and other payments or relief theretor and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence appear m and prosecute in its own name anv action or proceedings or to make anv compro 
mise or settlement in connection with such taking or damage All such compensation awards damages rights 
of action and proceeds including the proceeds of anv policies of fire and o thT insurance affecting said propertv 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiarv who may after deducting therefrom ad its expenses including attornev s fees 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation award damages and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee mav require 
9 At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary pavment of its fees and pre 
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconvevance for cancellation and 
retention) without affecting the liability of anv person for the pavment of the indebtedness secured hereby 
Trustee mav (a) consent to the makmg of anv map or plat of said propertv (b) join in granting anv ease 
ment or creating any restriction thereon (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the hen or charge thereof (d) reconvev without warranty all or anv part of said propertv The „rantee in 
any reconvevance may be described as the person or persons entitled thereto and the recitals therein of anv 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustees 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph 
10 As additional security Trustor herebv assigns Beneficiary during the continuance of these trusts all 
rents issues royalties and profits of the property affected bv this Trust Deed and of anv personal property 
located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the pavment of anv indebtedness secured herein or in the per 
formance of any agreement hereunder Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents issues re values 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and pavable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid 
Trustors right to collect any of such monevs shall cease and Beneficiarv shall have the n„ht with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby to collect all rents rovalties issues and profits failure or 
discontmuance of Beneficiary at anv time or from time to time to collect anv such monevs shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement bv Beneficiarv of the right power and authoritv to c licet the same 
Nothing contained herein nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiarv to collect shall be or be construed to 
be an affirmation bv Beneficiarv of any tenancv lease or option nor an assumption of liability under nor a 
subordination of the hen or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancv lease or option 
11 Upon any default by Trustor hereunder Beneficiary may at anv time without notice either in 
person by agent or bv a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor herebv consenting to the appointment of 
Beneficiary as such receiver) and without regard to the adequacy of anv secuntv for the indebtedness hereby 
secured enter upon and take possession of said propertv or any part thereof in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents issues and profits including those past due and unpaid and applv the same less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection including reasonable attorney s fees upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby and in such order as Beneficiary may determine 
12 The entering upon and takinH possession of said propertv the collecton of such rents issues and 
profits or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies or compensation or awards ft r in t iking or 
damage of said property and the application or release thereof as aforesaid shall not cure or waive anv 
default or notice of default hereunder cr invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice 
13 The fadure on the part of Beneficiarv to promptly enforce anv right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and the waiver bv Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a w m c r cf anv other 
or subsequent default 
14 Time is of the essence hereof I pe n default bv Trustor in the pavment of anv indebtedness secured hire 
by or in the performance of anv agreement hereunder all sums secure 1 herebv shall immodiitciv become clue 
and pavable at the option of Beneficiarv In the event of such default Beneficiarv m n execute r e n\ irustee 
to execute a written notice cf ele fault and of eie«_ ion o cause said pre pertv to be sc Id to s iti f i cli m ns 
hereof and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each eountv wherein said propertv er some part or 
parcel thereof is situated Beneficiary also shall dei osit with Trustee the note and all documents ewdencing 
expenditures secured hereby 
on Trustor, shall sell sail property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine Unit subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall" tie sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shail be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. Tin? recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (I) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence ot title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10'; per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF ss* ^ 
On the ./. day of "sy^fr^rf^r^:.. , A.IX 19/.^.., personally 
appeared before m e ^ ^ ^ ^ , e ^ 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that xecu.t.ed the 
!
^QjL<r. 
<...^^.^.,..,...:ryr Jy J Notary Public residing at: 
My Commission Expires: /-^r" /7 J/ / ^.-''•*/, Vj> : ' 
__, , £>?^^JL^..A^J^:u,-.. 
7'*v. i/<?fd / / v>\... """'V 
'''' "•••? ^ '- \ •'' (If Trustor a Corporation) S,;; -S ' * V 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF ss* 
On the day of , A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me , who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of , 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public residing at: 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TO: TRUSTEE. 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured 
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust 
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment 
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above 
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you 
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties 
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder. 
Dated , 19.. 
Mail reconveyance to 
Q 
w 
w 
Q 
EH 
CO 
« 
S 
a 
IS 1 
Q 
120 
25008 
BEGINNING 980 feet West of the Southeast Corner of the 
Southwest 1/4 of Section 4, Township 17 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 1320 feet; 
thence West 1264 feet; thence South 625 feet; thence 
Southeasterly along the roadway 541 feet; thence South 
470 feet; thence East 840 feet to beginning. More or 
less 35 Acres 
BEGINNING 980 feet West of the Northeast Corner of the 
Northwest 1/4 of Section 9, Township 17 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence South 1320 feet; 
thence West 840 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence East 
840 feet to beginning. More or less 25 Acres. 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
